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This study aims to explore the background implications of English words 
even, still, and but: unlikelihood, expectation, and contrast, respectively, 
characterized by their subjectivity. In contrast with previous works, this study is 
particularly interested in the validity of different semantic and pragmatic 
approaches in characterizing the implications with respect to context. 
The implications in focus have not been thoroughly investigated in previous 
works. Most pieces concerning these items are pragmatics book chapters on 
iii 
conventional implicature, which present the three words as typical triggers of 
conventional implicatures. Opposed to the conventional implicature approach, 
Bach (1999) argues that the notion itself is deceptive, and the implications vary in 
meaning according to the context. Neither view, however, analyzes distinctive 
properties of the context within which the implications occur nor attempts to verify 
their superordinate based on more widely supported and comprehensive 
approaches like pragmatic presupposition or not-at-issue content. 
This work utilizes three frameworks to describe the phenomena: 
conventional implicature, pragmatic presupposition, and not-at-issue content. First, 
taking a conventional implicature approach, I demonstrate that although these 
implications are conventionally rooted, their specific meanings derive from the 
context of conversation. Second, within the framework of the common ground 
theory of pragmatic presuppositions, the implications are observed to have a 
common ground requirement and occur in extensive contexts stretching from 
immediate linguistic context to general world knowledge. These properties set 
them apart from informative and anaphoric presuppositions alike, which is 
problematic for the account of accommodation in the theory. 
Finally, the implications are analyzed within the framework of the not-at-
issue content theory (Tonhauser et al., 2013). Adopting the taxonomy system in 
Tonhauser et al. (2013), I propose that the implications of even, still, and but are 
projective not-at-issue contents of Class D, which show a strong contextual felicity 
constraint but no obligatory local effect. Class D in Tonhauser et al. (2013) 
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includes a few discourse-related inferences, but not conventional items like the 
implications of even, still, and but. The heterogeneity is explained through a novel 
property of obligatory global effect, which may or may not accompany contents 
without obligatory local effect.  
The last approach of not-at-issue contents, unlike the former two, provides 
with tools to better understand the phenomena. The presence of a strong contextual 
felicity constraint confirms the contextual dependence of the implications not 
sufficiently elucidated by either the conventional implicature or pragmatic 
presupposition view. In addition, the context which constrains the implications is 
determined to range from global to local, supporting its aforementioned 
extensiveness.  
At the end of the day, this study has significant implications for the study of 
background meanings. First, it discovers that the implications of even, still, and but 
constitute a distinctive class of meaning with peculiar contextual properties, 
showing lack of clear membership in conventional implicatures and pragmatic 
presuppositions, and being heterogeneous even from Class D of not-at-issue 
contents. Next, it hints at inherent loopholes in the theories of conventional 
implicature and pragmatic presupposition which fail to construe the phenomena 
thought to be typical instances. Finally, it contributes to a unified understanding of 
not-at-issue contents by adding new candidates to Class D that are distinguished 
from other members and suggesting a possible subdivision criterion. 
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This paper is concerned with the lexical items even, still, and but which are 
arguably known to give rise to conventional implicatures (henceforth, CIs). Even, 
still, and but each introduce a background implication1: unlikelihood, expectation, 
and contrast2, respectively. For illustration, from (1) to (3) are utterances containing 
these words: 
 
(1) Even a child can solve the problem! (A child is not likely to solve the 
problem) 
(2) Amy is beautiful but poor. (There is a contrast between being beautiful and 
being poor) 
(3) Bob still doesn’t have a computer. (Bob is expected to have a computer) 
                                           
1 Background meaning or implication in this thesis is employed as an umbrella term 
which denotes an expression’s meaning that is not asserted or proffered (Roberts, 1996) as 
its central meaning but hidden and directly undeniable (see Roberts et al., 2009; Simons et 
al., 2010). I use the term in order to maintain neutrality and avoid using the terms from 
competing theories such as implicature, presupposition, or not-at-issue content. 
 
2 Labeling the three implications is done in line with previous works (Karttunen & 
Peters, 1979; Bennet, 1982; Levinson, 1983; Kay, 1990, Francescotti, 1995; Bach, 1999; 
Horn, 2004; Huang, 2007). First, even is known to indirectly indicate that a proposition is 
unlikely or unexpected to various degrees. The next implication, expectation regarding still 
always concerns time; that something is expected by a certain time point. Last, the term 
contrast for but not only signifies that between antonyms but is also used in the literature 
(Levinson, 1983; Bach, 1999; Horn, 2004; Huang 2007) to broadly refer to preclusion or 
relations between meanings with opposing features, like beautiful (positive) and poor 
(negative).  
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In (1), even introduces an implication concerning its focus child that a child 
is not likely or unexpected to solve the problem. Next, the contrast                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
implication of but in (2) is that between the two conjuncts, beautiful and poor. The 
last implication, that of still in (3), is that Bob is expected to own a computer. 
Above, these implications are quite obvious and intuitively understood, whereas in 
the sentences to follow, they are not: 
 
(4) ?Even a teacher can solve the problem. (A teacher is least likely to solve the 
problem) 
(5) ?Amy is beautiful but nice. (There is a contrast between being beautiful and 
being nice) 
(6) ?Bob still doesn’t have a robot. (Bob is expected to have a robot) 
 
In order for a sentence with each of these triggers to be felicitous, not only 
the speaker has to take its implication for granted, but also the hearer must have 
some contextual knowledge about it. That is, in (4), if and only if the interlocutors 
mutually believe that teachers are not good at solving problems; in (5) that 
beautiful people are generally not nice; and in (6), that one is obviously expected to 
have a robot, these utterances are felicitous. In this way, these implications place a 
constraint on the context. 
The literature surrounding even, still, and but is rather scarce. Although they 
appear in linguistics textbooks as typical examples of words having conventional 
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implicatures, their implications have not often been described in-depth. Perhaps the 
first scholar to discuss the items in focus is Frege (1918), who suggested that still 
and but each add an implication of expectation and contrast, respectively, without 
changing the semantic meaning of an utterance. Whereas Frege (1918) never used 
the term conventional implicature, researchers following him such as Grice (1975), 
Karttunen & Peters (1979), Bennet (1982), Levinson (1983), Kay (1990), 
Francescotti (1995) and Huang (2007) view even, still, and but as typical CI 
triggers.  
Contrary to the canonical CI view, Bach (1999) denies the existence of 
conventional implicature altogether. He proposes that the so-called conventional 
implicature triggers, what he terms ACIDs (alleged conventional implicature 
devices) such as even, still, and but in fact contribute to what is said, and are 
variable according to the context.  
Interestingly, the CI and counter-CI views both make reference to context. 
Nevertheless, in neither is the role of context or what features such context exhibits 
fully explicated. Furthermore, both views do not attempt to analyze these 
implications within the frameworks of more widely attested classes of meaning 
such as pragmatic presupposition or not-at-issue content. Last but not least, works 
on both sides handle a very limited number of made-up examples but not real-life 
data. 
For analyzing even, still, and but, there are three applicable theories of 
background meanings: Gricean conventional implicature, the common ground 
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theory of pragmatic presupposition, and not-at-issue content. First, the CI theory, as 
stated above, has been the dominant view in the limited literature concerning even, 
still, and but. Second, the common ground theory of pragmatic presupposition is a 
prevalent theory which is nowadays known to subsume other classes such as CIs 
and semantic presuppositions. Finally, the theory of not-at-issue contents is a 
relatively recent yet influential one, developed by Judith Tonhauser, David Beaver, 
Craige Roberts, and Mandy Simons. It is an exhaustive theory that encompasses 
new phenomena such as Pottsian CIs, non-restrictive relative clauses, some 
conversational implicatures, as well as classical presuppositions.  
In this thesis, the background meanings of even, still, and but are analyzed 
within the above three frameworks, taking advantage of real-life examples from the 
BNC Corpus. It is concluded that the former two, notions of conventional 
implicature and pragmatic presupposition, fail to capture important aspects of these 
meanings. The contextual dependence of the meanings of the implications of even, 
still, and but cannot be explicated by the former, whilst their strong common 
ground requirement and extensiveness of context present challenges for the latter. 
On the contrary, the analysis of even, still, and but according to Tonhauser 
et al.’s (2013) taxonomy system of not-at-issue contents has implications for both 
Tonhauser et al. (2013) and the current study. After close diagnosis, the background 
implications are adjudged elements of Class D in the taxonomy, yet greatly 
distinguished from other original constituents in the same class, giving weight to 
Tonhauser et al.’s (2013) proposed heterogeneity of projective contents. 
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1.2 Motivation 
The words even, still, and but differ in meanings, syntactic behaviors, and 
parts of speech. Nevertheless, their aforementioned implications have long been 
clustered under the class of conventional implicature as its representative examples. 
The current collective study of these three words is further motivated by their 
implications sharing the property of subjectivity: unlikelihood, expectation, and 
contrast involving certain nonobjective judgment by the interlocutors.  
Among typical background meanings discussed in various research, those 
of even, still, and but are exceptional in that they are subject to opinionated 
judgment by the speakers apart from the assertion itself. Such judgment may be 
something that most people can agree upon, or at other times, the speakers’ 
particularized opinion. (1) repeated here as (7) is exemplary of the former, and (4), 
here (8), the latter. 
 
(7) Even a child can solve the problem! (A child is not likely to solve the 
problem) 
(8) ?Even a teacher can solve the problem. (A teacher is least likely to solve the 
problem) 
 
In (7) and (8), what the speaker is asserting is that a child or a teacher can 
solve the problem. In addition to such proposition, the speaker also must believe 
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that a child is less intelligent in (7) and that a teacher is in (8). The former belief is 
common sense that most people would concede, while the latter is based on the 
speaker’s personal opinion on teachers and thus more controversial. For (8), if the 
hearer also has the same belief, then it is felicitous.  
Unlike even, still, and but, other representative CIs and presuppositions lack 
such subjectivity. For example, the sentences from (9) to (13) are all fairly 
objective statements about an event or state. A big difference between other 
background meanings and those of even, still, and but is that even when the 
sentence containing each word is objective, the implications of the latter always 
necessitate subjective judgment. 
 
(9) Only Mary came to the party. (Mary came to the party)3 
(10) Mary is almost thirteen years old. (Mary is not thirteen) 
(11) Mary doesn’t know that it is raining outside. (It is raining outside) 
(12) She is the author of this book. (There is a female referent) 
(13) a. Even Mary came to the party.  
b. Mary is thirteen years old, but she can cook.  
                                           
3 This paper makes use of a non-controversial background implication or presupposition 
of each trigger as widely accepted by researchers. For instance, the word only in (9) is 
known to give rise to more than one implication: the prejacent implication (‘Mary came’), 
the exclusive implication (‘No one other than Mary came’), and the existential implication 
(‘Someone came’). Nevertheless, the inference of only which is generally accepted by 
linguists to be backgrounded or implicated by the sentence is the first, the prejacent 
implication, the other two being asserted and entailed contents, respectively (e.g. see 
Roberts 2006). In cases like this, I only deal with commonly accepted background 
implications in line with the canonical view. 
7 
c. Mary still doesn’t know that it is raining outside.  
 
The examples in (9) to (13) draw contrast between other typical background 
meanings and those of even, still, and but. From (9) to (12), the CIs and 
presuppositions in parentheses resulting from the boldfaced words concern 
verifiable facts about the discourse or outside world that we can determine truth or 
falsity. The anaphoric presupposition in (12) is most obviously objective: if it is not 
true that a female referent has been mentioned in the current discourse, 
presupposition failure occurs. Other presuppositions and CIs are closely related to 
the state or event that each proposition containing them describes. For instance, (9) 
is a factual statement about the party event to which only Mary came. The 
prejacent implication coming from only is also judged either true or false 
depending on whether Mary was present at the same event. Likewise, in (10), from 
Mary’s state—her age—we can judge whether the assertion and the implicature are 
true or not.  
On the other hand, even, still, and but involve another nonobjective 
judgment by the speaker, opinionated rather than factual, distinct from the assertion 
itself. First, (9)’s counterpart, (13a), involves an additional opinion of the speaker 
apart from the party that takes place: that Mary is deemed unlikely to come. In 
(13b), the assertion that Jane is thirteen years old and can cook at the same time is 
subject to truth-value judgment: it is either true or false depending on Mary’s state. 
Nevertheless, the implicated contrast between the two conjuncts, which amounts to 
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saying that most thirteen-year-olds do not know how to cook, is a domain of 
subjective opinion. Finally in (13c), it is also the speaker’s own opinion that Mary 
is expected to know that it’s raining by now. As such, each background proposition 
accompanies personal judgment by the speaker. 
The commonality of the implications of even, still, and but being subjective 
in this way has spurred more research on their behaviors. Prone to nonobjective 
judgment by the interlocutors, the implications are determined to be heavily 
dependent upon the context which the particular interlocutors are set in. This study 
discovers that these implications share distinctive contextual properties which will 
be discussed in the following chapters. 
 
1.3 Scope of Research 
When researchers put forward that even, still, and but each have an 
implication of unlikelihood, expectation, and contrast, it is intuitively understood, 
as these regard their somewhat representative usages. Nevertheless, when closely 
inspected, even, still, and but are polysemous, even homonymous, and not all their 
usages retain the alleged implications. Before moving on to further discussions, I 
delimit which, among a variety of meanings and usages of even, still, and but, this 
research is directly concerned with.  
Evidently, uses of even, still, and but in other parts of speech or with 
distinct meanings from the ones considered so far are excluded from this research. 
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For instance, sentences containing the following are not considered: 
 
(14) even numbers/ an even road/ still motion/ but for …/ not only … but also … 
 
More subtle treatment of each item is necessary. Firstly, the particular even 
that this research is interested in is the adverb even used as a focus particle 
emphasizing the focus directly following it. Not only the adjectival or verbal 
usages of even but also collocational constructions containing adverbial even where 
even precedes if or though are not considered: 
 
(15) a. The shop will always be open even if no one comes.  
b. Even though the end result frustrated her, she never gave up. 
 
Other simple sentences with even preceding its focus as the following are 
investigated into. 
 
(16) a. Even Bill likes Mary. 
b. Cathy invited even Derek. 
c. Erin even put potatoes in the soup. 
d. Fred arrived even after the professor came in. 
 
In each of the sentences above, the subject, object, verbal phrase, and 
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adverbial phrase, respectively, is the focus of even. 
For the aspectual particle still, the implication that an event or entity is not 
expected is weak in plain sentences without negation, meaning ‘at present’ or ‘in 
the future as previously’. On the other hand, when still is used with the negative, 
especially a negated past participle like in Frege (1918)’s example, the meaning is 
similar to ‘yet’ with the implication retained:  
 
(17) a. John's still waiting. 
b. Amy still goes to church. 
c. Bob still doesn't have a kid. 
 
In the first two examples, it is neutral as to whether John is expected not to 
wait or whether Amy is expected not to go to church. In contrast, for the last 
negated sentence, there is a clear implication that Bob doesn't have a kid yet, 
although it is naturally expected for a person like Bob to. Only the latter is relevant 
to this research. 
The conjunction but is generally used to show contrast, meaning ‘on the 
contrary’, but it still has different usages when collocated in particular ways, 
meaning ‘except’ or ‘otherwise than’. Moreover, when used sentence-initially, but 
may function as a discourse marker similar to and, with a weakened contrast 
implication (Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman, 1999; Bell, 2007).  
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(18) a. She was so overcome with grief she could do nothing but weep. 
b. There is no hope but by prayers. 
 
(19) People cannot make use of a technique unless the technique really works, 
and that it works at least to the extent it is believed to work. This is the 
second criterion. But there is one more thing to consider in a definition of 
usefulness.  
(Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy as cited in Bell, 2007, ex. 22) 
 
Since the contrast implication is not clear in the examples above, such 
usages are not included in this research. When but is used as a conjunction directly 
bridging two conjuncts within a sentence, it retains the implication: 
 
(20) Amy is smart, but she tends to be mean. 
 
In the following sections, I discuss the implications behind even, still, and 
but with examples within the scope above.  
 
1.4 Organization 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 
outlines theoretical background of this research, namely conventional implicature, 
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presupposition, and not-at-issue content. In the following sections, the phenomena 
are explored relative to the three theories. Chapter 3 points to limitations of the 
theories of conventional implicature and pragmatic presupposition, with the data 
from the BNC corpus. On the contrary, in Chapter 4, close inspection of these 
meanings according to Tonhauser et al. (2013) shows results that contribute 
significantly to both this study and the theory of not-at-issue contents. Finally 
Chapter 5 concludes the research by pinpointing what significance it can have to 
the study of background meanings and anticipating future research that can further 
progress its ideas. 
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2. Theoretical Background on Background Meaning 
Before examining the implicit meanings that even, still, and but have, this 
chapter deals with theoretical background on different categories of background 
meanings that they possibly belong to: conventional implicature, presupposition, 
and not-at-issue content. Not-at-issue content is the broadest concept encompassing 
the latter two, and pragmatic presupposition may include conventional implicature. 
Historically, each class of meaning has been brought up to achieve a different goal: 
conventional implicature to explain the conventional property of some implicatures 
in contrast to conversational implicature, pragmatic presupposition to analyze 
presuppositions pertinent to the interaction between interlocutors in a real 
conversation, and not-at-issue content in order to provide with an exhaustive 
account of background contents that project. Nevertheless, they share the common 
fundamental property of being backgrounded, contrary to what is said (Grice, 1975; 
1989) or asserted. 
 
2.1 Conventional Implicature 
Conventional implicature4 is not a class of meaning which every linguist 
                                           
4 The term conventional implicature in this paper is used to refer to the class of meaning 
as discussed by Grice and taken by others (Levinson, 1983; Horn, 2004; Salmon, 2011; 
Potts, 2013; Karttunnen & Peters, 1979; Francescotti, 1995; Huang, 2007). It is to be 
distinguished from Potts’ (2005) notion of conventional implicature, which is a class of 
speaker-oriented meaning associated with expressives (e.g. bastard) and appositives. This 
paper is not interested in the latter, which does not include even, still, and but as its subset. 
14 
avows to exist, nor is it fully worked out in details. Nonetheless, even, still, and but 
have been argued by a number of researchers (Karttunen & Peters, 1979; Levinson, 
1983; Francescotti, 1995; Horn, 2004; Huang, 2007) to be CI triggers. Grice (1975) 
briefly discusses its notion in the following passage:  
 
If I say (smugly), He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave, I 
have certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my 
word, to its being the case that his being brave is a consequence of 
(follows from) his being an Englishman. But while I have said that 
he is an Englishman, and said that he is brave, I do not want to say 
that I have said (in the favored sense) that it follows from his being 
an Englishman that he is brave, though I have certainly indicated, 
and so implicated, that this is so. I do not want to say that my 
utterance of this sentence would be, strictly speaking, false should 
the consequence in question fail to hold.  
(Grice, 1975, p. 44-5) 
 
CI is a subset of Grice’s (1975) IMPLICATURE, a component of speaker 
meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is meant, separated from what is said 
(Horn, 2004, p. 3). There are two types of implicature: conversational and 
conventional. The former, which is more popularly discussed, arises from 
conversational principles, such as the cooperative principle, whereas the latter is 
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known to derive conventionally from each individual lexical item like manage, 
bother, almost, only, even, still, and but (Karttunen & Peters, 1979; Levinson, 1983; 
Potts, 2013). For illustration, (21) shows typical examples of the two subtypes of 
implicature. 
 
(21) a. Even KEN knows it’s unethical. 
a′. Ken is the least likely [of a contextually invoked set] to know it’s 
unethical. 
b. [in a recommendation letter for a philosophy position] 
Jones dresses well and writes grammatical English. 
b′. Jones is no good at philosophy. 
(Horn, 2004, p. 3) 
 
In each pair above, the primed sentence is the implicature behind its 
unprimed counterpart. The unlikelihood implication of even as in (21a') is encoded 
in the lexicon in an idiosyncratic way. One cannot explain why the implication is 
attached to the word even through any pragmatic principle. The relationship 
between the two is thus said to be conventional. In contrast, the conversational 
implicature of (21b), spelled out as (21b'), emerges as a result of cooperative 
interlocutors’ applying conversational rules, such as the maxim of Relevance. 
Assuming that (21b) is relevant to the purpose of the letter, the reader can infer that 
the author wrote (21b) to suggest (21b').  
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One representative property of CI resulting from conventionality is its non-
cancellability. The contrast between conversational and conventional implicatures 
regarding this property is illustrated below: 
 
(22) a. The Duke of Norfolk has three mansions, and in fact more.  
b. ??The Duke of Norfolk has three mansions, but only one car, and there is 
in fact no contrast between these two facts.  
(Levinson, 1983, ex. 114-5) 
 
As seen above, unlike its conversational counterpart, conventional 
implicatures are non-cancellable without making an utterance unacceptable. There 
is no way that the contrast implicature in (22b) can be removed in a felicitous 
utterance, whereas there is no problem for the speaker in (22a) to cancel the 
implicature ‘no more than three’ (Levinson, 1983, p. 129).  
Another important property of CIs is that a CI, unlike an entailment or 
presupposition, plays no role in determining the truth conditions of a sentence 
(Karttunen & Peters, 1979, p. 12). This non-truth-conditionality results in the 
property of detachability of a CI. Following is a pair of sentences, with and 
without a CI, claimed to express the same proposition: 
 
(23) a. Susan is poor but honest. 
b. Susan is poor and honest. 
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It is argued that in (23) the conventional implicature of but—that there is a 
contrast between being poor and being honest—does not contribute to the meaning 
of (23a). Thus, the truth conditions of (23a) are equivalent to (23b) without the CI; 
the CI is detachable without changing the truth-conditional meaning of the 
sentence. 
As admitted by researchers investigating the phenomenon, the notion of 
conventional implicature is not very coherent and tends to be rather shaky (Huang, 
2007; Horn, 2004). Although Karttunen and Peters (1979) claim that what have 
been considered pragmatic presuppositions are really part of conventional 
implicatures, most works nowadays affirm just the opposite: so-called conventional 
implicatures can be incorporated into pragmatic presuppositions.  
 
2.2 Pragmatic Presupposition  
In recent years, discussions surrounding conventional implicature are 
mostly limited to Pottsian CIs (see footnote 4). Instead, the so-called conventional 
implicatures such as those of even, still, and but are actually now understood as 
part of pragmatic presuppositions (Horn, 2007; Bach, 1999; Simons, 2006).  
Traditionally, there have been two approaches to presuppositions: semantic 
and pragmatic. Due to Frege (1892) and Strawson (1950), presuppositions were 
defined semantically as what is required in order for a proposition to have a truth 
value. There are certain expressions called presupposition triggers which generate 
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such presuppositions. For instance, the assertion of (24) necessitates a particular 
presupposition to be true, due to the trigger Kepler in it.  
 
(24) Kepler died in misery. 
 
Here, the presupposition that the name Kepler designates some entity is a 
requirement for (24) to have a truth-conditional meaning (Frege, 1892 (1952, p. 
69)). If there is no Kepler, (24) is judged neither true nor false. 
On the contrary to the semantic theory, nowadays, there is a widespread 
consensus among researchers discussing the phenomenon that the grammatical or 
semantic presupposition can be assimilated into the pragmatic concept following 
Stalnaker (1974) (Boër & Lycan, 1976; Levinson, 1983; Abbott, 2000; Potts, 2013). 
In lieu of semantic truth conditions, pragmatic presuppositions relate to felicity 
conditions in a discourse. This section outlines an influential theory of pragmatic 
presuppositions, the common ground theory, and its central concepts. 
  
2.2.1 Common Ground Theory 
A PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITION in the common ground theory (Stalnaker, 
1974, 1978, 2002) is defined as a background assumption taken for granted by the 
interlocutors. While the semantic approach focuses on what a sentence or linguistic 
expression presupposes, its pragmatic counterpart aims to explain what people in a 
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conversation presuppose. In this account, a speaker’s presupposition which is 
believed or assumed by the speaker to hold in the common ground becomes a 
presupposition of the discourse. The relevant context, that of common ground, 
denotes the set of propositions that all members accept, all believe that all accept, 
all believe that all believe that all accept, etc. (Stalnaker 2002, p. 720). 
The source of pragmatic presuppositions, though not explicitly specified in 
the works of the pioneer (Stalnaker, 1974, 1978, 2002), is mostly viewed as 
equivalent to semantic presuppositions of sentences. Stalnaker (1974) notes that 
semantic presuppositions can be explained in terms of pragmatic presuppositions, 
but not vice-versa. In other words, presupposition triggers in the Strawson-Frege 
account are expected to introduce pragmatic presuppositions as well. For example, 
the existence presupposition in (24) can be accounted for pragmatically. The 
speaker, in uttering (24), righteously presupposes the fact that an entity named 
Kepler exists, and also believes or assumes that the other party presupposes it as 
well, hence part of the common ground. 
Presuppositions serving as requirements for felicity, sentences place 
constraints on the common ground that their presuppositions be entailed by it prior 
to utterance. This is called the common ground requirement (henceforth, CG 
requirement) (Tonhauser, 2015). For instance, if a speaker utters the sentence 
 
(25) The King of France is bald. 
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he presupposes that there exists a King of France and asserts that this 
person is bald. The existence presupposition is required to be old information 
mutually believed by the interlocutors (i.e. already existing in the common ground) 
before the utterance of (25). If it is not satisfied by the common ground, the 
utterance in (25) is deemed infelicitous by the addressee. 
 
2.2.2 Presupposition Accommodation 
Contrary to the theory, not all presuppositions in a real conversation exist in 
the common ground prior to an utterance. Numerous studies (Karttunen, 1974; 
Lewis 1979; Heim, 1992; Stalnaker, 1998, 2002; Beaver & Zeevat, 2007; von 
Fintel, 2008) have discussed the phenomenon of PRESUPPOSITION 
ACCOMMODATION, through which an uncontroversial presupposition of an 
utterance not presupposed before springs into existence after the utterance. An oft-
cited rule for accommodation is due to Lewis (1979): “If at time t something is said 
that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just 
before t, then—ceteris paribus and within certain limits—presupposition P comes 
into existence at t.” (p. 340). For illustration, we can consider the following: 
 
(26) I have to pick up my sister. (The speaker has a sister) 
 
According to the common ground theory, in (26), the fact that the speaker 
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has a sister needs to be entailed by the common ground before its utterance. 
Nevertheless, if it is new information to the hearer, the process of accommodation 
takes place. After the speaker utters (26), the presupposition is updated to the 
common ground so that it becomes a prior context that entails the former. With the 
context properly restored, the hearer can finally interpret the assertion in (26).  
Accommodation has often been criticized as a convenient rescue strategy 
the common ground resorts to whenever a lack of CG requirement needs be 
justified (Gauker, 1998; Abbott, 2000, 2008). In particular, Gazdar (1979) 
explicitly accuses the common ground theorists for having recourse to 
accommodation which “circumvent[s] any possibility of counterexamples” and 
therefore renders their alleged “appropriacy” relative to mutual knowledge vacuous 
(Gazdar, 1979, p. 107).  
Against this denunciation, the CG theorists contend that accommodation is 
a natural and systematic process resulting from the interlocutors’ cooperation 
(Thomason, 1990; von Fintel, 2000). In order to carry the discourse forward, 
cooperative addressees adjust the common ground “quietly and without fuss” (von 
Fintel, 2008) whenever they notice that the CG requirement is not satisfied. The 
only exception to the accommodation of uncontroversial presuppositions is 
anaphoric presuppositions that simply cannot be identified, which will be 
explained in Chapter 2.2.3. In turn, all uncontroversial, identifiable presuppositions 
which are not entailed by the common ground are viable objects of accommodation. 
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2.2.3 Anaphoric Presupposition and Informative 
Presupposition 
Presuppositions can be divided into two classes, according to their 
availability of being accommodated. First, some presuppositions including a few 
conventional implicatures, possessive noun phrases, and that-clauses of it-cleft 
sentence, can be new information, accommodated by the addressee after an 
utterance. Presuppositions of this former class which do not have to exist in the 
common ground before an utterance and are thus accommodable are called 
INFORMATIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS (Abbott, 2000, 2008; Tonhauser, 2015; Roberts 
et al., 2009). (26) and ones below are examples: 
 
(27) It was the Smiths who disclosed the decades-old corruption in the village. 
(Somebody disclosed the decades-old corruption) 
(28) We regret that children are not allowed in the premises. (Children are not 
allowed) 
 
In (27), the it-cleft structure presupposes the complement of who. However, 
in ordinary conversations, one need not be aware of the fact that there exists 
somebody who disclosed the said corruption. Similarly, in (28), the verb regret 
presupposes its complement which is not necessarily entailed by the common 
ground. For instance, the speaker might be making a new announcement to the 
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hearer to inform that children are not allowed. As such, informative 
presuppositions are potentially informative to the hearer, not required to be in the 
common ground prior to utterance. 
However, not all presuppositions can be accommodated. Stalnaker (2002) 
admits that ANAPHORIC PRESUPPOSITIONS, presuppositions anaphorically 
constrained by the context like those of pronouns and too, are exceptions to the 
phenomenon of accommodation. Their antecedents are not accommodatable, 
because they “concern facts in the world no manner of mental adjustment can bring 
into being” (von Fintel, 2008, p. 154), because the hearer simply “does not know 
what it is that the other is presupposing” (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 718). For example, 
presupposition accommodation does not take place in (29) to (31): 
 
(29) He gave up.  
(30) John went to the concert.  
(31) John had a hamburger, too.  
 
What the triggers indicate in (29)-(31) can only be determined by retrieving 
intended antecedents in the context (Roberts et al., 2009). The utterance of (29) 
makes use of the pronoun he that refers to “a uniquely salient discourse referent” 
(Tonhauser, 2015, p. 78). Also, in (30), there must be a particular concert in the 
common ground, and in (31), both the speaker and the hearer must know of another 
person who had a hamburger prior to its utterance. These presupposed referents 
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cannot be accommodated due to lack of information to interpret these sentences in 
the first place. We can compare these with the examples below, the same sentences 
uttered after such common ground is formed: 
 
(32) John grew tired of linguistics. He gave up. 
(33) Maroon 5 came to Seoul last weekend. John went to the concert. 
(34) We ate hamburgers for lunch. John had a hamburger, too. 
 
In the examples above, the antecedent for each of he, the concert, and too is 
entailed or implied by the preceding sentence, which is added to the common 
ground, making the utterance felicitous. Without such appropriate contexts, the 
utterances with unidentifiable anaphoric triggers would result in infelicity, not 
accommodation. The following summarizes the two classes of pragmatic 
presuppositions. 
 
(35) Classification of presupposition 
1) Informative presuppositions: accommodable, can be new information, 
 possibly not entailed by CG 
2) Anaphoric presuppositions: non-accommodable, cannot be new 
 information, crucially entailed by CG 
 
25 
2.3 Not-at-issue Content 
As the common ground theory of presuppositions became the norm, there 
has also been abundant literature on the opposing side which cast doubt on the 
validity of associating presuppositions with common ground. In parallel with such 
discussions, recently, there have been attempts to incorporate different types of 
background meanings. 
Representative of this trend are works by researchers Judith Tonhauser, 
Craige Roberts, Mandy Simons, and David Beaver (Roberts et al., 2009; Simons et 
al., 2010; Tonhauser et al., 2013). The co-authors ignited the discussion around 
NOT-AT-ISSUE CONTENTS, opposed to what is said or at-issue, defined as 
backgrounded contents that are not relevant to the question under discussion 
(QUD), the imminent goal of a conversation. This class of meaning cuts across 
various types of background implications, including classical presuppositions and 
newly explored phenomena such as parentheticals, focus, expressives, and some 
conversational implicatures. For example, conversational inferences such as the 
one in (36), which have not been dealt with in the common ground theory, are also 
elements of not-at-issue contents: 
 
(36) A: I have to pay this bill. 
B: The customer accounts office isn’t open today. 
(Roberts et al., 2009, ex. 9) 
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In (36), the QUD is whether A can pay his bill. There are two background 
assumptions that are inferentially derived from the conversation: first, that one 
should pay such bills at the customer accounts office, and second, that A will not be 
able to pay her bill today. The latter implication is at-issue, directly answering A’s 
implicit question, while the former is a not-at-issue content that is backgrounded 
(Roberts et al., 2009, p. 5).  
 
2.3.1 Projection 
The co-authors put forward that not-at-issue contents are equivalent to 
projective meanings (Simons et al., 2010). PROJECTION, a widely discussed 
phenomenon of presuppositions, refers to the ability of a presupposition to survive 
under entailment-canceling operators. It has been considered a unique property of 
presuppositions, and in particular, the P family test of projection in Chierchia and 
McConnell-Ginet (1990) is commonly adopted as a diagnostic for 
presuppositionality. The P family includes the original declarative sentence 
containing the trigger, negation, question, and an if-clause with the trigger in the 
antecedent:  
 
(37) a. The present queen of France lives in Ithaca. 
b. It is not the case that the present queen of France lives in Ithaca. 
c. Does the present queen of France live in Ithaca? 
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d. If the present queen of France lives in Ithaca, she has probably met Nelly. 
e. There is a unique present queen of France.  
(Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990, ex. 40, underline added) 
 
Here, each of (37a-d) implies (37e), which is the presupposition of the 
definite description the present queen of France. The presupposition survives under 
the scope of entailment-cancelling operators of negation, question, and conditional; 
hence, projects (Simons et al., 2010). 
The researchers maintain that such an account that identifies 
presuppositions with projective meanings is proven no longer valid (Tonhauser et 
al. 2013), as recent research (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990; Beaver, 2001; 
Potts, 2005) found a variety of items like appositives, non-restrictive relative clause, 
and expressives that are not presuppositional in nature but do project. For instance, 
in (38), a non-restrictive relative clause (NRRC) introduces non-presuppositional 
but projective content. 
 
(38) a. Jane, who likes to be physically active, runs, plays tennis, and swims. 
(Roberts et al., 2009, ex. 6, underline added) 
b. It is not the case that Jane, who likes to be physically active, runs, plays 
tennis, and swims. 
c. Does Jane, who likes to be physically active, run, play tennis, and swim? 
d. If Jane, who likes to be physically active, runs, plays tennis, and swims, 
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she should go for the triathlon game. 
e. Jane likes to be physically active.  
 
In (38), the content in the NRRC is not presuppositional in the sense that it 
is subject to any requirement to be entailed by the common ground (Roberts et al., 
2009, p. 6). Nevertheless, under the P family test, the not-at-issue content survives. 
Each of the sentences in (38a-d) implies (38e), and the latter is thus projective. 
In lieu of the traditional accounts, the authors’ main goal is to provide a 
unified account of not-at-issue contents, corresponding to projective contents, that 
sheds light on the phenomenon of projection. One of such attempts is to put 
together those contents traditionally classified as different types of background 
meanings and provide a novel method to categorize them in Tonhauser et al. (2013). 
 
2.3.2 Taxonomy of Not-at-issue Contents 
Tonhauser et al. (2013) classifies not-at-issue contents in English and 
Guarani based on three properties: strong contextual felicity constraint, projection, 
and obligatory local effect. Not-at-issue contents, all projective, fall into four 
different groups according to whether they are associated with a strong contextual 
felicity constraint and whether they show obligatory local effect. This section 
overviews the taxonomy system based on the two properties. 
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2.3.2.1 Contextual Felicity 
First, CONTEXTUAL FELICITY is related to whether felicitous utterances 
containing a not-at-issue content are restricted to contexts that already entail or 
imply it. When the utterance context necessarily entails or implies the implication, 
its trigger is said to have a strong contextual felicity constraint. In Tonhauser et 
al.’s (2013) terms, 
 
If utterance of trigger t of projective content m is acceptable only 
in an m-positive context, then t imposes a strong contextual felicity 
constraint with respect to m.  
(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 11) 
 
A subset of the utterance context, m-positive context is defined with 
reference to m-neutral context. The former is a context that entails or implies m 
while the latter is one that entails or implies neither m nor –m (Tonhauser et al., 
2013, p. 75). For illustration, following is the diagnosis of the possessive noun 
phrase.  
 
(39) [Context: A woman who is being interviewed by a school director for a job 
as a teacher suddenly interrupts and says:] 
I have to go now to feed my dog. 
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(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 20, boldface added) 
 
The context in (39a) is m-neutral, because it does not imply or entail that 
the speaker has a dog. Since the utterance (39) is acceptable even in the given m-
neutral context, possessive noun phrases do not have a strong contextual felicity 
constraint. On the other hand, anaphoric expressions such as pronouns, 
demonstratives, and the particle too are typical examples that do impose a strong 
contextual felicity constraint. 
 
(40) [Context: The children in a sociology class have to give presentations about 
their families. Marko is up first and he starts with:] 
a. #S/he is a farmer. 
b. My father’s name is Juan. He is a farmer. 
(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 19, boldface added) 
 
In (40a), the context is neutral with respect to the existence of the person 
that he refers to, and the utterance is infelicitous. On the other hand, in (40b), the 
first sentence introduces the relevant referent for he, becoming an m-positive 
context that renders the following utterance felicitous. As such, since an utterance 
containing the third person pronoun is acceptable only in an m-positive context, it 
imposes a strong contextual felicity constraint with regards to the existence 
implication.  
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2.3.2.2 Local Effect 
Next, a rather unfamiliar property termed LOCAL EFFECT regards the 
behavior of projective contents with respect to embedding operators such as 
propositional attitude verbs. When an implication is necessarily included by the 
local context, it is said to have obligatory local effect. A refined definition is 
provided below: 
 
A projective content m with trigger t has obligatory local effect if 
and only if, when t is syntactically embedded in the complement of 
a belief-predicate B, m necessarily is part of the content that is 
targeted by, and within the scope of, B.  
(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 40) 
 
In other words, if the implication of an embedded trigger is necessarily true 
in the context of the attitude holder, it has obligatory local effect. For illustration, 
consider the following: 
 
(41) a. Joan is crazy. She’s hallucinating that some geniuses in Silicon Valley 
have invented a new brain chip that’s been installed in her left temporal lobe 
and permits her to speak any of a number of languages she’s never studied. 
Joan believes that her chip, which she had installed last month, has a 
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twelve year guarantee.    
b. Jane believes that Bill, who is Sue’s cousin, is Sue’s brother.  
  (Amaral et al., 2007, ex. 735; Tonhauser et al. 2013, ex. 38-39) 
 
The contents in non-restrictive relative clauses (NRRCs) are known to be 
backgrounded and projective implications. (41a) attributes to Joan, the attitude 
holder, that her brain chip was installed. In this case, the content in the NRRC is 
diagnosed to have local effect. On the other hand, in (41b), since the content in the 
NRRC that Bill is Sue’s cousin is inconsistent with Jane’s belief—she thinks Bill is 
Sue’s brother—the former is not part of the local context of Jane’s belief state but 
only that of the global utterance context. Therefore, the content of the NRRC in 
(41b) does not have local effect. Since local effect for NRRCs is judged optional, 
they do not show obligatory local effect. 
 
2.3.2.3 Classification 
Following is the categorization of four different groups of projective 




Table 1: Four classes of projective contents in Tonhauser et al. (2013) 
 
Class A, with both a strong contextual felicity constraint and obligatory 
local effect, has as its elements anaphoric implications such as that of too. In 
contrast, Class B is neither associated with a strong contextual felicity constraint 
nor shows obligatory local effect. It includes Pottsian CIs as well as classical 
presuppositions of demonstrative that and possessives. Next, projective contents in 
Class C are ones considered as Gricean CIs like the prejacent implication of only 
and the factive and prestate presuppositions of know and stop, respectively, that 
have a strong contextual felicity constraint but no obligatory local effect. Finally, a 
class deemed extraordinary and wanting more candidates, Class D has obligatory 
local effect yet no strong contextual felicity constraint, and subsumes implications 
about the discourse like the salience of alternatives of a focus.5 
                                           
5 Tonhauser et al. (2013) supports the view that a trigger may have multiple implications. 
For instance, too has two implications in this study: anaphoric presupposition in Class A 
and discursive salience of an alternative in Class D. In the sentence “John is having dinner 
in New York, too”, the presupposition that there is another person having dinner in New 
York is an element of Class A. On the other hand, a rather unfamiliar implication, that such 
an alternative person is salient in the current discourse is that of Class D. The latter 
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The authors claim that since these backgrounded, projective meanings are 
in fact heterogeneous, their unified account of projective contents is “preferable to 
a collection of disparate theories that individually account only for subsets” 
(Tonhauser et al., 2013, p. 104). By showing that some background meanings are 
constrained by the context (A, D) while others are not (B, C), Tonhauser et al. 
(2013) proves against the view that projection occurs as the result of 
presuppositions placing constraints on the context (Karttunen, 1974; Heim, 1983; 
van der Sandt, 1992; Geurts, 1999). On the other hand, the optionality of local 
effect (not obligatory for Class B, D) serves as counter-evidence to the view of 
projection as a by-product of the global context of conversation being updated with 




                                                                                                           
implication is due to Kripke (2009) who emphasizes that the existence presupposition is not 
sufficient to utter the sentence out of the blue: it is so evident that there exists at least one 
person who is having dinner in NY (Class A), but in addition, the speakers should have 
some particular alternative that’s been made prominent in the discourse (Class D). 
35 
3. The Phenomena of Even, Still, and But and 
Limitations of Previous Approaches 
This section examines the phenomena of the background meanings of even, 
still, and but within the frameworks of conventional implicature and pragmatic 
presupposition. Traditionally, scholars have claimed that they are instances of 
conventional implicature. In addition, as pragmatic presuppositions are to contain 
CIs, it must be possible to analyze even, still, and but according to the former. 
Nonetheless, upon close inspection, it is concluded that the two theories cannot 
adequately capture the phenomena, failing to construe important aspects of these 
meanings.  
 
3.1 Conventional Implicature Approach on Even, Still, 
and But 
As the previous works concerning even, still, and but mostly view their 
background meanings as CIs, this section examines the validity of the CI approach. 
Two pertinent characteristics of the implications as candidates of CIs are their 
conventionality and contextually derived imports. 
 
3.1.1 Conventionality 
The strongest reasoning behind viewing even, still, and but as CI triggers is 
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their conventionality. Since the term itself is not straightforward, researchers 
attempt to prove that they display different properties stemming from 
conventionality. The evidence that most frequently appears in the literature is that 
the meanings are detachable, and do not affect the sentence’s truth conditions 
(Grice, 1975; Francescotti, 1995; Bennett, 1982; Karttunen & Peters, 1979).  
 
(42) a. Even Albert failed the exam. 
b. Albert failed the exam. 
(Francescotti, 1995, ex. 1-2, boldface added) 
 
(42b), equivalent to (42a) lacking even, is argued to be the truth-conditional 
meaning of (42a). The researchers contend that even if the implication that Albert 
is not likely to fail the exam is false, (42a) will be judged true as long as (42b) is 
true. This is because even allegedly contributes nothing to the truth-conditional 
meaning of the sentence, instead of having a truth-value gap like presuppositions. 
Nevertheless, it is not obvious whether speakers will indeed judge (42a) as 
true when the implication is false. Researchers have long contended that the truth-
value judgment is not a reliable diagnostic, as the semantic truth-value is “not 
something that is subject to secure and direct intuition” (von Fintel, 2001, p. 8). In 
fact, speakers may assign truth-values to sentences without them, and vice-versa 
(von Fintel, 2001; Thomason, 1990; Soames, 1976). Furthermore, Bach (1999) 
adds that even if it is judged true, it is a result of a forced categorical choice 
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between ‘true’ and ‘false’ (p.345). The matter is not as simple since there could be 
many more answers in-between like infelicitous, squeamish, or somewhat 
acceptable.  
Second, it is argued that such implications are encoded in the individual 
lexical items, hence the conventionality (Bennett, 1982; Karttunen & Peters, 1979; 
Francescotti, 1995). No one can deny that such implications are part of 
idiosyncratic lexical content. The relationship between the word still and its 
expectation implication cannot be explained by a general rule, and is indeed 
conventional. However, this fact is not sufficient to prove that they are CIs, as 
many presuppositions such as those of the, stop, and know are known to be 
conventionally triggered, yet not CIs (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990). Some 
scholars (e.g. Karttunen & Peters, 1979) go as far to say that except for 
conversational inferences, all presuppositional contents are conventionally rooted 
to different extents. 
On a similar note, non-cancellability is a central property of CIs that is 
employed to prove the conventional source of these implications. In other words, as 
the triggers retain their implications regardless of the conversational context and 
thus cannot ever be cancelled, their source is not the conversation, but convention. 
For instance, some presuppositions are known to be cancellable, as in (43), while 
CIs like but are not: 
 
(43) a. Susan consulted Dr. Jones before she finished her thesis. 
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b. Susan died before she finished her thesis. 
 
(44) Trudy is hard-working but socially awkward, #but in fact there is no contrast 
between those two facts. 
 
In (43), the presupposition that Susan finished her thesis which usually 
accompanies the conjunction before is cancelled in (43b) due to the general logic 
following the verb die. On the other hand, in (44), it is impossible to felicitously 
deny the contrast implication of but. Nevertheless, having an alleged trait of CIs 
does not guarantee the status of each background meaning as a member of that 
class. There are non-cancellable presuppositions, like those of the verb stop or 
possessive pronouns, which are not considered conventional implicatures 
nonetheless: 
 
(45) Trudy used my computer, #but in fact the computer doesn’t belong to me. 
 
To sum up, although the implications of even, still, and but can be said to 
display conventionality, it does not justify that they are conventional implicatures. 
The arguments by researchers are either unreliable (e.g. non-truth-conditionality) or 
insufficient to prove such membership. 
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3.1.2 Contextually Derived Meanings 
A more fundamental way to confirm that the background meanings of even, 
still, and but truly belong to the class of CI is to seek homogeneity among these 
meanings and other constituents. I maintain that, contrary to the CI view, the factor 
of context actually differentiates the former from the latter. Although the 
implications of unlikelihood, contrast, and expectation are conventionally encoded 
in the items, their specific meanings actually derive from the conversational 
context. On the other hand, the meanings of other CIs are not only non-cancellable 
but consistent regardless of the context:  
 
(46) Only Mary came to the party. (Mary came to the party) 
(47) Alex almost died. (Alex didn’t die) 
(48) Bob managed to win. (It required effort for Bob to win) 
 
In (46) to (48), each implicature in parentheses is interpreted independently 
of the context. For instance, (46) can be uttered in many different contexts: Mary 
may be the only person, woman, classmate, or neighbor that came to the party. 
Nevertheless, in any case, such a context does not change the meaning of the 
prejacent implication that Mary came to the party. In this way, it is possible to 
calculate the CI automatically from the linguistic structure regardless of the 
conversational setting.  
40 
In contrast, the meanings of the implications of even, still, and but may vary 
according to the context. Starting from even, I examine how context plays such an 
important role determining the import of each implication. Francescotti (1995) 
mentions in his article that there is a contextually salient aspect X with regards to 
which the unlikelihood occurs. For illustration, he gives an example where the 
aspect X determines the felicity of a sentence: 
 
(49) a. Granny was accused of murder, and even kidnapping. (X: frequency) 
b. Granny was accused of kidnapping, and even murder. (X: moral/ legal  
 seriousness) 
(Francescotti, 1995, ex. 26/27) 
 
(49a) is felicitous if Granny being accused of kidnapping is more surprising 
than her being accused of murder. According to Francescotti (1995), this is so if the 
contextually determined aspect is frequency, as kidnapping occurs less frequently 
than murder. Nevertheless, our common sense tells us that murder is more striking 
than kidnapping. In other words, without any mentioning of a certain standard for 
expectation, the interlocutors are more likely to pick legal/moral seriousness as X, 
hence rendering (49a) infelicitous and (49b) felicitous. If the speaker utters (49a) in 
an out-of-the-blue context, it can be challenged by the hearer: 
 




The context may even change the meaning of the implication of even in a 
single sentence. For instance, in (51) the context determines what X is, and 
according to X, the implication φ of something being surprising or unlikely differs. 
 
(51) Ibrahim never goes out, not even to the shops or nothing. (BNC: A74 33) 
 a. X: routineness 
   φ: ‘It is surprising that Ibrahim does not go to places he goes to 
       everyday such as the shops’ 
b. X: Ibrahim’s preference 
   φ : ‘It is surprising that Ibrahim does not go to places he loves such as 
       the shops’ 
 
In (51a), the fact that Ibrahim does not go to the shops may be less likely 
than going to other places such as the museum or fancy restaurants from the 
perspective of routineness. On the other hand, in (51b), it could be the case that 
Ibrahim loves going shopping the most, and on the scale of his preference, not 
going to the shops is less expected than going to the park or the library. Which 
reading holds depends on the context, such as what kind of conversation went on 
previously between the interlocutors. In this way, the unlikelihood implication of 
even may have disparate meanings according to what kind of X the context picks 
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out as the relevant standard for unlikelihood. 
With still, as Bach (1999) admits, less contextual filling-in is required than 
others, because there is only one possible relevant dimension for expectation, time 
(p. 348-349). Nevertheless, the temporal dimension can be further broken down. 
Sometimes, it is necessary for the context to fill in what kind of time aspect X is, 
and this can alter the import of the implication. There could be different categories 
of time: physical time, life span, generation, era, etc. For example, the following 
sentences may have different aspects X: 
 
(52) My father still doesn’t have an ID. (X: life span) 
(53) Amy still doesn’t have a cell phone. (X: era) 
(54) I still haven’t received your email. (X: physical time) 
 
In (52), the expectation that the speaker’s father has an ID is with respect to 
his age, or stage of life in the total span. On the other hand, the implication in (53) 
is due to the contemporary era of 21st Century where one is expected to have a cell 
phone. Finally, (54) is simply concerned with the physical time of now. In the 
examples above, what type of time X is is quite evident, even in an out-of-the-blue 
context, but in other sentences, the context fills in X:  
 
(55) She still had not been to confession. (BNC: GUK 2655) 
  a. X: physical time 
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   φ: ‘She was expected to have been to confession by then’ 
  b. X: life span (age) 
   φ : ‘She was expected to have been to confession by her age’ 
 
If the speaker was previously talking about how he had waited for the 
female referent to have come by a certain period of time (e.g. 2pm or in the year of 
1999), the implication will have the meaning in (55a). On the other hand, its import 
in (55b) is different. For example, it could mean that she was twenty years old and 
the speaker expected that she had been to confession by that age. In the latter case, 
the physical time of hour, day, month, or year does not matter, but the point in her 
life span does. According to the context, the standard of time for expectation differs, 
resulting in different meanings for the implication of still. 
Lastly, but can implicate different contrasts, as determined by the context. 
Typically, the implication regards the contrast between two conjuncts that but 
connects. Nevertheless, as Bach (1999) points out, there could be other 
contextually-determined contrastive features: 
 
(56) Shaq is huge but he is agile. 
a. Shaq is huge and, unlike most huge people, he is agile. 
b. Shaq is huge and, unlike others on the list, he is agile. 
c. Shaq is huge and, contrary to what you said, he is agile. 
(Bach, 1999, p. 346) 
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In (56a), the salient contrast is that between being huge and being agile; in 
(56b), it is between Shaq and other players on the list; and in (56c), between Shaq’s 
agility and the hearer’s previous statement about huge people. The first contrast, 
that in (56a), may be the most straight-forward one, yet others can also be 
acceptable in different contexts. Following is another example from the corpus 
where the meaning of the implication may differ, according to which propositions 
(p1 and p2) are being contrasted:  
 
(57) Anne is lost, but I know where she is. (BNC: AIJ 1262) 
a. p1: Anne is lost 
p2: I know where she is. 
b. p1: Your statement 
  p2: I know where she is. 
  (=Anne is lost, but unlike what you said, I know where she is) 
 
In (57a), there is a contrast between Anne’s whereabouts that others lost 
track of and the speaker’s knowing it. Alternatively, there might have been a certain 
context that allows the reading in (57b). For instance, the speaker may have said 
(57) in response to the addressee’s prior statement, 
 
(58) Is Anne lost or something? I bet nobody knows where she is. 
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In (51) to (57), the unlikelihood, expectation, and contrast implications of 
even, still, and but, respectively, have different imports according to which context 
such utterances occur in. This shows that the meanings of these implications 
originate from the context, unlike other CIs whose imports remain the same 
regardless of the context. The heavy reliance of the implications of even, still, and 
but on the context not only sets apart from other CIs but also contradicts the 
purported context-independence of conventional implicatures (Levinson, 1983; 
Huang, 2007; Karttunen & Peters, 1979). 
In a nutshell, as there is little justification as to the claim that the 
implications of even, still, and but belong to the class of CIs, and as they do not 
show strong membership from the perspective of context, these meanings are not 
true instances of CI. 
 
3.2 Pragmatic Presupposition Approach on Even, Still, 
and But 
Although researchers have not yet dealt with even, still, and but within the 
framework of the CG theory of pragmatic presupposition, it is known to subsume 
CIs, which have been argued to include the implications of even, still, and but. 
Besides, their property of being backgrounded and taken for granted by 
interlocutors clearly renders them as valid candidates of pragmatic presuppositions. 
This section explores the implications from the perspective of pragmatic 
46 
presupposition: whether they place a constraint on the common ground (i.e. 
whether they have a CG requirement), how they are distinguished from the two 
classes of presuppositions, and accordingly what the CG theory fails to explain 
about these implications.  
 
3.2.1 Common Ground Requirement 
The background meanings of even, still, and but seem to place a constraint 
on the common ground. For illustration, (59) requires the contrast implication to be 
satisfied by the common ground before its utterance. 
 
(59) Pat is Russian, but he can’t eat spicy food. 
 
(59) presupposes the contrast between being Russian and not being able to 
eat spicy food (i.e. Russians normally can eat spicy food). We can suppose that the 
speaker has uttered (59) to an addressee who does not have prior knowledge that 
Russians eat spicy food, hence the implication being new information not in the 
common ground. In this case, uttering (59) is very awkward, and the background 
implication will not be easily accommodated by the hearer. On the contrary, the 
reason that sentences like (1) to (3), repeated here as (60) to (62) are felicitous even 
in out-of-the-blue contexts is because the interlocutors have what we call common 
sense: 
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(60) Even a child can solve the problem!  
(61) Amy is beautiful but poor.  
(62) Bob still doesn’t have a computer. 
 
Here, the propositions that children are less capable, being beautiful is 
positive while being poor is negative, and nowadays one is expected to have a 
computer exist in the common ground as common sense between the interlocutors 
before each utterance, so they are felicitous. On the other hand, the following 
examples, when they are uttered in an out-of-the-blue context, can be awkward: 
 
(63) Even I have taken kids on the canals, it's great! (BNC: KLT 798) 
(64) […]Martin was hot but nothing too traumatic. (BNC: KBW 8793) 
(65) Romania still has not learned how to look after its own.( BNC: K1C 803) 
 
If the hearer does not have any information about the speaker and his 
relationship with kids, (63) will be deemed awkward by the hearer. Similarly, (64) 
is infelicitous in normal cases where being hot and being traumatic are not easily 
juxtaposed. Finally, (65) can be unacceptable in contexts where the concept of self-
sovereignty of states is not yet established.  
It shows that the implications of even, still, and but have a CG requirement 
that they exist as old information in the common ground and that they are difficult 
to accommodate. For instance in (63), the hearer will have hard time 
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accommodating “quietly and without fuss” (von Fintel, 2008, p. 151) after the 
utterance that somehow the speaker is not expected to take kids on the canals and 
instead, may have to ask him for more information. The hearer can challenge the 
speaker: 
 
(66) What do you mean, even? Of course, like any teacher, you could’ve taken 
your kids on the canals.  
 
When there is a refined context for each sentence that contains the 
background implication, as hinted or directly mentioned in the BNC corpus, they 
are felicitous. For instance, in the reconstructed contexts of (67) to (69), the above 
sentences are perfectly felicitous: 
 
(67) Context: The speaker, Andrew, is a very serious teacher, who rarely spends 
time with kids outside of the classroom. Andrew says: 
 Even I have taken kids on the canals, it's great! (BNC: KLT 798) 
 
(68) Context: Martin and Ian are siblings who are both ill. While Ian has a hot 
fever and is suffering from a trauma at the same time, Martin only has a fever. 
The speaker says: 
Martin was hot but nothing too traumatic. (BNC: KBW 8793) 
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(69) Context: In the modern era, countries have become sovereign states, auto-
governing their people without interference from outside.  
   Romania still has not learned how to look after its own. (BNC: K1C 803) 
 
In (67)-(69), each implication must be non-informative old information 
entailed by the context in order for the utterances to be felicitous. Interestingly, in 
each of (67) and (68), the relevant context is limited only to the particular 
conversational setting, while the context of (69) that entails the expectation 
implication of still is quite common sense to the contemporaries. Some more 
examples from the corpus that require a certain common ground to be established, 
or otherwise awkward, are provided below with the background implication as φ: 
 
(70) Even in Europe, Saturn is not the only planet under whose influence it is 
possible to be born. (BNC: A04782) 
 φ: It is surprising that in Europe, Saturn is not the only planet…  
 
(71) I can't even juggle three (BNC: KDA 2530) 
 φ: It is surprising that the speaker can’t juggle three. 
 
(72) It is un-- unusually quiet even even for us. (BNC: JTE 137) 
 φ: It is not likely for the speakers to find it quiet. 
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(73) That poems are alive but they run away from you[…] (BNC: JSU 240) 
 φ: There is a contrast between poems being alive and their running away. 
 
(74) It [an insurance broker] has cash flow but its assets are its people. (BNC: 
A1E 171) 
 φ: There is a contrast between an insurance broker having a cash flow and 
 having people as assets 
 
(75) When they sat down to eat, Emily had still not appeared. (BNC: ACV 2471) 
 φ: Emily was expected to appear when they sat down to eat. 
 
(76) So whoever got the bike now still haven't changed the log book over to their 
name. (BNC: KBE 6430) 
 φ: The person who got the bike is expected to have changed the log book 
 over to their name. 
 
In the examples above, when the common ground between the interlocutors, 
whether the immediate utterance context or general common knowledge, does not 
contain the background implication φ, the sentences are not felicitous. For example, 
for (73), it is hard to accommodate that there is a contrast between being alive and 
running away, if not a cause-and-effect relationship. Nevertheless, when there is 
contextual background that justifies the contrast, it is felicitous. Indeed, in the prior 
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context presented in the corpus, the literature teacher who is the speaker of (73) 
talks about how poems are freely existing things but are elusive and hard to find, 
just like foxes. Only with the common ground already set to at least imply the 
contrast between merely existing and being able to be spotted, can (73) be 
felicitous.  
The implications having a CG requirement can easily be contrasted with 
informative presuppositions. As seen in Chapter 2.2.3, informative presuppositions, 
when not included in the common ground beforehand, can be accommodated after 
an utterance. For instance, the following sentences can be uttered in out-of-the-blue 
contexts: 
 
(77) Susan failed to climb Mt. Everest. (Susan tried, or should’ve tried to climb 
Mt. Everest) 
(78) My cousin is coming by. (The speaker has a cousin) 
(79) Alex almost fainted. (Alex didn’t faint) 
 
In (77) to (79), the hearer need not be aware of the background information 
in parentheses. Even when the context does not entail or imply the presuppositions, 
the speaker can utter these sentences. If, for example, the hearer has no information 
about Alex, after the speaker utters (79), he can accommodate that he didn’t 
actually faint.  
On the other hand, similar to even, still, and but, anaphoric presuppositions 
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are also constrained by the context.  
 
(80) She is the senator from California. (There is a female referent) 
(81) Tonight, Sam is having dinner in New York, too. (There is another person 
having dinner in New York) 
 
When uttered out of the blue, it is impossible to accommodate what she and 
too in (80) and (81), respectively, presuppose. Although the implications of even, 
still, and but are hard to accommodate, their accommodability differs from 
anaphoric presuppositions in its extent: the former are more weakly constrained by 
the context. For instance, an overly cooperative addressee, upon hearing (59), may 
find it difficult but plausible to accommodate that Russians tend to eat spicy food, 
but when he hears (80) without any antecedent in the common ground, there is no 
way for him to accommodate the presupposition. In this way, there is a continuous 
spectrum of accommodability for presuppositions: Informative presuppositions, 
implications of even, still, and but, and anaphoric presuppositions form a gradience 
of being accommodable, difficult to accommodate, and non-accommodable, 
respectively. 
There is a clearer feature that distinguishes even, still, and but from 
anaphoric presupposition triggers: extensiveness of the relevant context for the 
former, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.2.2. 
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3.2.2 Extensiveness of Context 
The triggers even, but, and still are similar to anaphoric expressions like he 
in the sense that their inferences are to be present in the context before the 
utterance. The greatest difference between the former and the latter is that the 
former do not require their implications to be antecedents in the immediate 
discursive or linguistic context, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 3.2.1.  
 
(82) He got home early today.  
 φ: There is a contextually salient male referent. 
 
(83) Even after ‘drying out’, they may feel strongly pulled back into the drug 
world. (BNC: A01 116) 
 φ: It is surprising that they may feel pulled back into the drug world after 
drying out. 
 
(84) They lived frugally but in style. (BNC: A05 882) 
 φ: There is a contrast between living frugally and living in style. 
 
(85) […][T]he driver admitted: I still haven’t got a phone. (BNC: A9W 114) 
φ: The speaker is expected to have a phone. 
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In (82), the referent of he must be retrievable from a proximate context. For 
instance, he cannot refer back to a particular entity the speaker and the hearer were 
talking about a week ago; there needs to be a mention of the antecedent in the past 
not too distant from the utterance time. Typically, these antecedents exist in the 
immediate linguistic context, like in the examples from (32) to (34), repeated here 
as (86) to (88).  
 
(86) John grew tired of linguistics. He gave up. 
(87) Maroon 5 came to Seoul last weekend. John went to the concert. 
(88) We ate hamburgers for lunch. John had a hamburger, too. 
 
On the contrary, in each of the examples from (83) to (85), it is not required 
that each implication exist as a concrete, uttered proposition in the common ground 
like the referents of the anaphoric presuppositions. Even if the interlocutors have 
never said or explicitly agreed upon the implications, because these are entailed by 
their common sense, (83) to (85) can be uttered. For instance, anybody who knows 
that one is not expected to indulge into the drug world after drying out (i.e. going 
through detoxification), that living frugally normally precludes living stylishly, and 
that nowadays one is expected to have a phone will judge these sentences felicitous. 
The context which entails the background propositions is thus much 
broader with even, still, and but: it extends beyond linguistic context to general 
knowledge of the participants about the external world. Different types of contexts 
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are compared in the following examples:  
  
(89) John promised that he will arrive by noon. He still hasn’t come. 
(90) (The interlocutors got a letter the day before that John would arrive by noon 
today) 
 John still hasn’t come. 
(91) My father still hasn’t got a driver’s license. 
 
From (89) to (91), the proximity of the context against which the 
implication of still is interpreted differs. In (89), just like anaphoric presuppositions, 
the preceding sentence forms the immediate linguistic context that entails the 
expectation of John’s arrival. In (90), the interlocutors, although not having said 
anything about the expected arrival, have set the common ground the day before. 
Lastly, in (91), the common ground is the common sense between the interlocutors 
that middle-aged men are generally expected to have a driver’s license. In this way, 
the context which constrains the implications of even, still, and but is much broader 
than anaphoric presuppositions. 
 
3.2.3 Counter-evidence for Accommodation Theory 
The lack of membership of the background meanings of even, still, and but 
in either class of presuppositions is problematic for the common ground theory of 
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accommodation. One might propose to formulate a new class, somewhere in the 
borderline between anaphoric and informative presuppositions, and the problem is 
solved. Nevertheless, such an attempt jeopardizes the theory of accommodation, 
which is central to the common ground theory. 
The reason that presuppositions can neatly be divided into the dichotomy 
between informative and anaphoric presuppositions lies in the common ground 
account of accommodation. In Chapter 2.2, we have seen that anaphoric 
presuppositions make up the only exception to the accommodation of 
uncontroversial presuppositions. Then, under a consistent theory, it must be the 
case that those presuppositions that are identifiable by the addressee are 
accommodable if they are not satisfied by the common ground prior to the 
utterance.  
However, those of even, still, and but are difficult to accommodate, and this 
cannot be attributed to unidentifiability (i.e. the hearer failing to pinpoint their 
presuppositions). Rather, after the utterance, the hearer knows what the 
presupposition is, but may still fail to accommodate it.  
 
(92) 10.10am — Still no decision about Tony.  (BNC: A00 382) 
 
We can suppose a situation where the speaker utters (92) above when the 
context does not contain the information that some kind of decision about Tony is 
expected. If so, as with informative presuppositions, since the presupposition is 
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new information that is identifiable by the addressee, it should be accommodated to 
the common ground. In keeping with Stalnaker (1998, 2002), this is not an 
exception like she and too, but rather the exact point where accommodation must 
take place. Nevertheless, in that situation, the utterance will be judged infelicitous 
instead, and may be challenged by the hearer: 
 
(93)  How do you mean? Were we supposed to decide that soon? 
 
Although the implications of even, still, and but are not valid exceptions to 
accommodation like anaphoric presuppositions, they are oftentimes not 
accommodated, which fact jeopardizes the theory’s consistency. The current theory 
cannot elucidate why the context can be restored through accommodation when 
informative presuppositions are new information but cannot be in the same 
circumstances with the implications of even, still, and but. 
Summing up, the implications of even, still, and but are neither anaphoric 
nor informative presuppositions, having a CG requirement but the relevant context 
being extensive, ranging from the immediate context to general world knowledge. 
The fact that they do not fit neatly in the dichotomy is problematic for the notion of 




4. Not-at-issue Content Approach on Even, Still, and 
But 
In Chapter 3, we have seen that the implications of even, still, and but are 
distinguished from conventional implicatures and informative and anaphoric 
presuppositions. This section, following Tonhauser et al.’s (2013) classification, 
examines how they can be explicated within the theory of not-at-issue contents. In 
order to do so, this section tests the implications of even, still, and but to decide 
which class in the taxonomy of Tonhauser et al. (2013) they are elements of.  
Tonhauser et al.’s (2013) account contains conventional implicatures such 
as those of almost and only, but lacks even, still, and but. Recall from Chapter 2.3.2 
that Class D triggers are projective contents that are associated with a strong 
contextual felicity constraint but do not display obligatory local effect. I show that 
even, but, and still belong to this class, if classified according to the properties the 
authors give, and also that they are distinguished from other elements in the same 
class.  
  
4.1 Properties of Even, Still, and But 
I use the definitions and diagnostics in Tonhauser et al. (2013) to test the 
three properties, strong contextual felicity constraint, projection, and obligatory 
local effect, of even, still, and but. Each subsection deals with the diagnostic 
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application of each property discussed in Chapter 2.3.2. In order to facilitate the 
reader’s understanding of the three properties and subtle treatments in the 
diagnostics, this section gives more examples in addition to those of Chapter 2.3.2. 
 
4.1.1 Presence of Strong Contextual Felicity 
Constraint 
Strong contextual felicity concerns the requirement to belong to the context 
prior to an utterance. The diagnostic in Tonhauser et al. (2013) which is 
accordingly adopted in this current study is presented below: 
 
(94) Let S be an atomic sentence that contains trigger t of projective content m. 
 (i) If uttering S is acceptable in an m-neutral context, then trigger t does 
 not impose a strong contextual felicity constraint with respect to m. 
 (ii) If uttering S is unacceptable in an m-neutral context and acceptable in 
 a minimally different m-positive context, then trigger t imposes a strong 
 contextual felicity constraint with respect to m. 
 (Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 24, underline added) 
 




(95) Context: Carla, a mother of three teenage daughters, falls on the way to the 
supermarket and breaks her leg. She’s been in the hospital for a week when 
her daughters come to visit her for the first time. When she asks them how 
they are doing, her youngest daughter blurts out:  
 Only I clean the house!  
 (Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 15, boldface added) 
 
Here, the context is neutral as to whether the speaker, Carla’s youngest 
daughter, cleans the house or not. Because the prejacent implication that the 
speaker cleans the house is accepted by the hearer when the sentence is uttered in 
the given m-neutral context, it does not have a strong contextual felicity constraint.  
Now the items in focus, even, still, and but are tested for the property of 
strong contextual felicity constraint. First, they are uttered in m-neutral contexts: 
namely, each context which does not entail or imply unlikelihood, expectation, and 
contrast, respectively.  
 
(96) Context: Lee is urging May to exercise for her health. Mentioning Bob, 
May’s distant uncle whom they don’t know well, Lee says to May: 
 ?Even Bob works out now and then. 
 
(97) Context: Lee and May are looking at the photos of their friend John. Lee 
suddenly says to May: 
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 ?John still hasn’t arrived. 
 
(98) Context: Lee and May are pointing to a book whose cover is red. Lee says to 
May: 
?This book is red but difficult. 
 
In (96), there is no mention or prior shared knowledge of Bob’s tendency 
not to work out, in (97), there is no expectation between the speakers of John’s 
arrival, and finally in (98), the contrast between being red and being difficult is not 
implied or entailed. In such m-neutral contexts, the utterances with even, still, and 
but are judged infelicitous. Below, the same utterances are made in m-positive 
contexts. 
 
(99) Context: Lee is urging May to exercise for her health. Bob is May’s uncle 
whom they think is very idle and doesn’t move around much. Lee says to 
May: 
 Even Bob works out now and then. 
 
(100) Context: Lee and May are looking at some photos of their friend John who 
was supposed to have arrived today. Lee says to May: 
 John still hasn’t arrived. 
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(101) Context: Lee and May are talking about some textbooks labeled by different 
colors. Those with a red cover are basic level whereas blue ones are 
advanced. Pointing at a red book, Lee says to May: 
This book is red but difficult. 
 
The context in (99) implies that Bob is not expected to exercise, since Lee 
and May both know he is idle. In (100), whether Lee and May are explicitly talking 
about John’s expected arrival or not, the context entails that there is a mutual 
expectation between the two speakers of John’s arrival. Lastly, in (101), the 
utterance context is one that entails that the book’s color and its level are correlated. 
Since this implicates a contrast between the reading levels of other red books and 
this book, it is an m-positive context.  
As seen in the diagnostic, since the utterances of even, but, and still are 
infelicitous in m-neutral contexts but felicitous in m-positive ones, they each 
impose a strong contextual felicity constraint on their implication. 
  
4.1.2 Presence of Projection 
The test of projection in Tonhauser et al. (2013) is further divided into sub-
diagnostics which make reference to the strong contextual felicity constraint 
discussed in Chapter 4.1.1. Simply put, if a trigger is associated with a strong 
contextual felicity constraint like even, still, and but, then an appropriate context, 
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which is an m-positive context, should be given in order to test whether the 
sentence projects or not.  
 
(102) Let S be an atomic sentence that gives rise to implication m. Let FOS(S) be a 
set of sentences consisting of S, a negative variant of S, an interrogative 
variant of S, a modal variant of S, and a conditional with S as its antecedent. 
 (i) Trigger t imposes a strong contextual felicity constraint with respect to 
 m: If utterances of FOS(S) are judged unacceptable in an m-neutral 
 context and acceptable in an m-positive context, then implication m is 
 projective. 
 (Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 37, underline added) 
 
Because even, still, and but were diagnosed to have a strong contextual 
felicity constraint, I adopt (102) to test their behaviors with respect to projection. 
First, the family-of-sentences of the sentences from Chapter 4.1.1 containing the 
triggers are tested in m-neutral contexts. 
 
(103) Context: Lee is urging May to exercise for her health. Mentioning Bob, 
May’s distant uncle whom they don’t know well, Lee says to May:  
 a. ?Even Bob works out now and then. 
 b. ?It is not the case that even Bob works out now and then. 
 c. ?Does even Bob work out now and then? 
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 d. ?It’s possible that even Bob works out now and then. 
 e. ?If even Bob works out now and then, you should exercise, too. 
 
(104) Context: Lee and May are looking at the photos of their friend John. Lee 
suddenly says to May: 
 a. ?John still hasn’t arrived. 
 b. ?It is not the case that John still hasn’t arrived. 
 c. ?Has John still not arrived? 
 d. ?It’s possible that John still hasn’t arrived. 
 e. ?If John still hasn’t arrived, we’d better call him. 
 
(105) Context: Lee and May are pointing to a book whose cover is red. Lee says to 
May: 
 a. ?This book is red but difficult. 
 b. ?It is not the case that this book is red but difficult. 
 c. ?Is this book red but difficult?  
 d. ?It’s possible that this book is red but difficult. 
 e. ?If this book is red but difficult, Carlos cannot read it. 
 
Like each original declarative sentence, the variants are judged infelicitous 
in m-neutral contexts. Now, I test whether the implications project in m-positive 
contexts.  
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(106) Context: Lee is urging May to exercise for her health. Bob is May’s uncle 
who they think is very idle and doesn’t move around much. Lee says to May, 
 a. Even Bob works out now and then. 
 b. It is not the case that even Bob works out now and then. 
 c. Does even Bob work out now and then? 
 d. It’s possible that even Bob works out now and then. 
 e. If even Bob works out now and then, you should exercise, too. 
 
(107) Context: Lee and May are looking at the photos of their friend John who was 
supposed to have arrived today. Lee says to May: 
 a. John still hasn’t arrived. 
 b. It is not the case that John still hasn’t arrived. 
 c. Has John still not arrived? 
 d. It’s possible that John still hasn’t arrived. 
 e. If John still hasn’t arrived, we’d better call him. 
 
(108) Context: Lee and May are talking about some textbooks labeled by different 
colors. Those with a red cover are basic level whereas blue ones are 
advanced. Pointing at a red book, Lee says to May: 
a. This book is red but difficult. 
 b. It is not the case that this book is red but difficult. 
 c. Is this book red but difficult?  
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 d. It’s possible that this book is red but difficult. 
 e. If this book is red but difficult, Carlos cannot read it. 
 
In (106)-(108), the family sentences are all felicitous in the m-positive 
contexts, and each implication that Bob is least likely to work out, that John is 
expected to arrive, and that there is a contrast between the red book in focus and 
the rest, respectively, survives in (b-e). Consequently, the implications are 
projective. 
 
4.1.3 Lack of Obligatory Local Effect 
The last property to be explored in Tonhauser et al. (2013), obligatory local 
effect, relates to inability to project to the global context distinct from the local 
context of an attitude holder. Its diagnostic when the trigger imposes a strong 
contextual felicity constraint is presented below: 
 
(109) Let S1 be an atomic sentence with trigger t of content m.  
Trigger t imposes a strong contextual felicity constraint with respect to m: 
Let S be a sentence where S1 is embedded under a belief-predicate. If 
utterance of S is acceptable when the utterance context entails m but the 
bearer of the attitude is explicitly ignorant of m, then the content m with 
trigger t need not have its effect locally, that is, does not have obligatory 
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local effect.  
(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 41, underline added) 
 
Anaphoric presupposition triggers, similar to even, still, and but, also 
impose a strong contextual felicity constraint. The same diagnostic is applied to the 
third person pronoun he: 
 
(110) [Context: The speaker, Ricardo, and Malena are lost in a city they’ve never 
visited before. The speaker, who, together with Ricardo, is a bit ahead of 
Malena, says:] 
#‘Look! There’s a man. Malena doesn’t see him. She thinks he is sick.’ 
(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 46, underline and boldface added) 
 
Here, the utterance context of the speaker and Ricardo is m-positive, 
entailing that the referent of he exists. Nevertheless, the attitude holder, Malena, is 
ignorant of this referent, so the implication is not part of the local context. Since 
the underlined sentence, S according to (109), is infelicitous in this case, the 
existence implication has obligatory local effect. 
In the following diagnoses of even, still, and but, the English propositional 
verb believe is used in m-positive global contexts—that is, those of the speakers—
in which each attitude-holder is ignorant of m: 
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(111) Context: Lee and May are talking about John, whose children are failing at 
school. They also know that among those children, Jane has the worst grades. 
Lee says to May: 
 John overestimates his children so much that he believes even Jane can 
 get an A, but he doesn’t know that Jane is the least likely one to. 
 
(112) Context: Lee and May are talking about a couple, John and Amy. They know 
that Amy has been trying to break up with John for a long time. 
 John believes that Amy still hasn’t left him, and all the worse, he doesn’t 
 even expect her to leave him soon. 
 
(113) Context: Lee and May are talking about their tall colleagues who tend to be 
unprofessional. Lee talks about their boss John’s impression of a newcomer 
Angela: 
John believes that Angela is tall but professional. Of course, John 
doesn’t know that those tall people in our office are so lazy and dull. 
 
In each of (111) to (113), the underlined sentence corresponds to S in (109), 
and the boldfaced, S1. Each global context is m-positive in that the utterance 
context between Lee and May entails the unlikelihood of Jane getting an A, the 
speakers’ expectation of Amy’s leaving John, and the contrast between being tall 
and being professional. Nevertheless, the belief holder, John, is ignorant of such 
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implication as the latter part of each utterance explicitly indicates. Therefore, each 
implication is attributed not to the local context of the attitude holder, but only to 
the global context of the speakers. As each utterance of S is acceptable where only 
the global, not local, context entails m, the triggers do not show obligatory local 
effect. 
 
4.2 Discussion  
A table below summarizes various not-at-issue contents in English (E) and 




Table 2: Classification of projective contents in English and Guarani in Tonhauser et al. 
(2013) 
 
To recapitulate the results in Chapter 4.1, even, still, and but impose a 
strong contextual felicity constraint but do not show obligatory local effect. Also, 
expected from their backgroundedness, their implications are projective. As a result, 
according to the table above, they belong to Class D. The following subsections 
discuss what this classification signifies, namely a heterogeneous Class D, and 
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wrap up the results by showing the implications of the findings. 
 
4.2.1 Heterogeneity of Class D 
In fact, Class D is a “tantalizing new area of research” (p. 100) to 
Tonhauser et al. (2013), whose constituents the authors have hard time pinpointing 
and leave to future research. The projective contents of Class D that Tonhauser et al. 
(2013) originally found are rather atypical contents that “tend to concern not facts 
about the external world that the interlocutors seek to describe, but facts about the 
discourse situation itself” (p. 100, italics added) such as discursive salience or 
deixis. For instance, the implication of indexical that that the speaker is actually 
indicating some suitable entity in the current discourse is a constituent of Class D.  
  
(114) a. [Context: Barney and Fred are walking down the street. They haven’t been 
discussing cars. Barney does not point to or otherwise indicate any of the 
cars parked in the street. Barney says:] 
#Wilma likes that car. 
 
b. [Same context as in [114]a:] 
#If Wilma likes that car, she has good taste. 
 
c. [Context: Barney points at a car and says:] 
72 
Pebbles thinks Wilma likes that car, but of course Pebbles has no idea  
that I’m pointing to it. 
(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 54) 
 
(114a) employs a context where such an implication is not satisfied, and 
thus infelicitous. This means that the indication implication of that is associated 
with a strong contextual felicity constraint. (114b) shows that in an m-neutral 
context the implication inside the antecedent of an if-clause does not survive, 
whereas an m-positive context where Barney is pointing to a car would render the 
same sentence felicitous; the implication is projective. Lastly, in (114c), Barney’s 
global context possibly contradicts the local context of Pebble’s belief world—i.e. 
Pebbles doesn’t know that the speaker is indicating a car—so there is no obligatory 
local effect. Another example found in Tonhauser et al. (2013) shows the salience 
implication of too lacking obligatory local effect. 
 
(115) [Context: Susi, Brian, Carlos, and Maria are at a party with lots of drunk 
people. Susi is worried about her friend Claudia and says to Maria:] 
‘Claudia is drunk and Brian thinks that Carlos, too, is drunk.’ 
(Tonhauser et al., 2013, ex. 57) 
 
The salience implication of too in Class D is that an alternative is salient in 
the current discourse, not that such an alternative exists, the latter being a Class A 
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element. In (115), the implication that ‘someone other than Carlos is being salient 
in the discourse’ is satisfied by the global context, with the prior mention of 
Claudia. But of course, the attitude holder Brian will be ignorant of the current 
conversation between Susi and Maria, and therefore of the salience of the 
alternative. Thus, the salience implication of too does not show obligatory local 
effect.  
The triggers I found here that belong to Class D, however, are very much 
distinguished from such contents. The authors anticipate Class D to be “a 
previously unrecognized class of projective content” (Tonhauser et al., 2013, p. 68, 
underline added) of “subtle discourse-oriented implications” (Tonhauser et al., 
2013, p. 102, underline added) like the salience implication. In contrast, the 
implications of even, still, and but are rather classical examples of background 
meanings which are evidently not about discursive saliency or deixis. They do not 
concern the discourse itself but unlikelihood, contrast, and expectation about the 
external world. 
The reason that Class D can encompass these heterogeneous items seems to 
be due to the last property, the lack of obligatory local effect. When a not-at-issue 
content does not display obligatory local effect, it may mean two things: 1) it never 
has local effect (i.e. it must project globally) or 2) it sometimes has local effect but 
at other times projects globally. I argue that the original Class D contents exemplify 
the former case, whilst the implications of even, still, and but are representative of 
the latter. First, the contents that Tonhauser et al. (2013) originally found have 
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obligatory global effect, as the salience and indication implications always concern 
the real conversation setting which serves as the global context: 
 
(116) a. [Context: Cathy and Derek are not pointing at a certain car. Their friend 
Amy is indicating a car, but Cathy and Derek cannot see her now so don’t 
know of this fact. Cathy says to Derek:] 
#Amy believes that car is cool. 
 
b. [Context: Cathy and Derek haven’t been discussing classes. Their friend 
Amy is talking about classes in a different conversation, but Cathy and 
Derek cannot see her now so don’t know of this fact. Cathy says to Derek:] 
#Amy believes that the Syntax class is difficult, too. 
 
c. [Context: Cathy and Derek haven’t been discussing people who could’ve 
stolen Amy’s wallet. Their friend Amy is talking about potential thieves to 
other friends, but Cathy and Derek cannot see her now so don’t know of 
this fact. Cathy says to Derek:] 
#Amy believes that JohnF stole her wallet. 
 
In (116), the salience and indication implications are not attributable to the 
global context, as the context of Cathy and Derek does not include them. For 
example, in (116a), if Amy is the one who is pointing to a car, but the speakers are 
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not, it is infelicitous to use that. Similarly, in (116c), if John’s alternatives are being 
made salient in the local context of Amy’s but not in the global context of Cathy 
and Derek, it is infelicitous to put focus on John. As such, in addition to not having 
obligatory local effect, the implications must always project globally. In contrast, 
the implications of even, still, and but do not have obligatory global effect. 
 
(117) a. [Context: Cathy and Derek don’t think that the CEO is not likely to favor  
Amy’s idea. Cathy says to Derek:] 
Amy believes that even the CEO will like her idea. (But of course, it’s so 
obvious to us that he will.) 
 
b. [Context: Cathy and Derek don’t expect John to turn in his paper. Cathy 
says to Derek:] 
Amy believes that John still hasn’t turned in the paper. (But of course he 
was never going to.) 
 
c. [Context: Cathy and Derek don’t think that there is a contrast between 
being smart and nice. Cathy says to Derek:] 
Amy believes that John is smart but nice. (But I have no idea why she 
thinks smart people are not supposed to be nice.) 
 
As seen in the sentences above, the not-at-issue contents of even, still, and 
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but do not necessarily project globally. To the speaker(s), the unlikelihood, 
expectation, and contrast implications do not hold, as indicated by the global 
context. The implications can be contradicted once more by the global context 
when the speaker adds the sentences in parentheses, but even so, the utterances are 
still felicitous. The global context in (117b), for instance, denies the expectation of 
John turning in the paper, whereas the local context of Amy’s belief contains it. In 
this way, although it is proven in Chapter 4.1.3 that there is no obligatory local 
effect for these items, they may optionally show local effect and not project 
globally. 
A new criterion adapted in this chapter substantiates the outward 
heterogeneity of the original items in Class D in Tonhauser et al. (2013) and the 
ones found in this research. The contrast derives from the former having no local 
effect but showing obligatory global effect contrary to the latter with optional 
global and local effects. 
 
4.2.2 Implications of the Results 
In sum, the not-at-issue content theory is inclusive of the background 
meanings of even, still, and but. The analysis in this section has implications for 
both this study and Tonhauser et al. (2013). For the current study, it has granted 
even, still, and but the status of not-at-issue content by showing that their 
implications are projective. In addition, the presence of a strong contextual felicity 
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constraint reaffirmed their contextual dependence, previously attested by the 
contextual base of the meanings and their CG requirement. Finally, the implication-
entailing context, ranging from local to global, reinforces its far-reaching 
characteristic found in Chapter 3.2.2. 
The most palpable contribution to Tonhauser et al. (2013) is that more 
elements were added to Class D, for which finding new candidates was thought to 
be demanding. What’s more, the new items do not resemble the ones originally 
found in Tonhauser et al. (2013). My findings suggest a much different picture of 
Class D from what Tonhauser et al. (2013) anticipates it to be.  
Perhaps the heterogeneity of Class D is a natural, even desirable, 
consequence of a unified account of not-at-issue contents. In fact, it is consistent 
with Tonhauser et al. (2013) in which constituents of each class are heterogeneous 
from the perspective of traditional theories. For instance, Class B consists of 
Pottsian CIs as well as classical presuppositions. The authors view this 
heterogeneity as indicative of "classifications of projective meanings that cross-cut 
the traditional notion of presupposition" (Tonhauser et al. 2013, p. 105). Then, the 
fact that Class D not only consists of discourse-related contents but also more 
classical implications of even, still, and but actually supports such intuition. 
This research also found that the difference between Tonhauser et al.'s 
(2013) original Class D items and the new ones arises from the fact that the lack of 
obligatory local effect can mean either no local effect at all or optional local effect. 
This finding points to a possible subdivision of each class according to an 
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All in all, the main aim of the current study has been to characterize the 
distinctive implications behind even, still, and but which share subjectivity as a 
fundamental property. This thesis has demonstrated, with support from the corpus 
data, that the implications these words trigger are unique in terms of context. They 
constitute a distinctive class of meaning with marked contextual properties, not 
harmonizing with the notions of conventional implicature and pragmatic 
presupposition, and also differentiated from other members of Class D in 
Tonhauser et al. (2013). 
I have shown that the CI and pragmatic presupposition views cannot 
sufficiently account for the phenomena. The imports of the implications are 
dependent upon the context, varying according to each context unlike other 
conventional implicatures. Also, the implications are constrained by the context 
which can extend beyond the immediate set of uttered propositions or discourse to 
general world knowledge. This peculiarity leads to their lack of membership in 
either anaphoric or informative presuppositions, which the accommodation theory 
cannot explicate.  
On the other hand, the reason that the distinctive meanings do not pose a 
threat to the not-at-issue theory is because the latter is an exhaustive theory that can 
encompass the entire range of not-at-issue meanings, as long as they are projective 
and backgrounded. Apart from being sweeping, the taxonomy in Tonhauser et al. 
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(2013) can contrive additional devices such as contextual felicity and local effect 
conducive to more fine-grained characterizations of each content.  
Within the comprehensive framework of not-at-issue content, the 
application of the diagnostics and the accompanying results provide new insight 
into the phenomena. The attested projectivity of the implications of even, still, and 
but confirms their backgroundedness or not-at-issueness. Also, the finding that the 
implications are strongly constrained by the context reinforces the contextual 
dependence suggested by their CG requirement and contextually derived meanings 
in previous chapters. Last but not least, even, still, and but being licensed by 
different levels of relevant context, from local to global, is in line with the intuition 
that the context is broad, extending from immediate context to general knowledge.  
Moreover, the results in Chapter 4 are suggestive of heterogeneity of 
projective contents that cut across the traditional divisions, as well as of the 
existence of more members in Class D. A new plausible criterion for subdivision, 
obligatory global effect, is proposed as the cause for the contrast between the 
original Class D items and even, still, and but. When more candidates for Class D 
are discovered in future studies, we can form a more accurate picture of it and find 
out whether this class needs subdivision.  
A positive step forward from this research is to find more items that behave 
in the identical ways with even, still, and but regarding the factor of context. Also, 
it is desirable to attempt to jump into the core of conventional implicature and 
inquire whether this family is a myth (Bach, 1999), in addition to examining what 
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the common ground theory of presupposition might be missing. Close inspection 
on even, still, and but and other triggers can bring about a more precise taxonomy 
of background contents.  
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Even, still, but의 배경 의미 탐구 
 
본 논문은 even (‘-조차도’), still (‘여전히’), but (‘-지만’)의 ‘예
외성’, ‘기대’, ‘대조’라는 배경 의미(background meaning)를 탐구하는 
것을 목표로 한다. 이전의 연구들과는 달리, 이 논문은 세 단어의 함의
를 문맥과 관련해 특징지을 수 있는 서로 다른 의미화용론적 접근법의 
유효성에 특히 주목한다. 
위 의미들에 관한 대부분의 기존 연구는 화용론 기본서의 고정함
축(conventional implicature)에 관한 단원으로서 이들 각각에 대해 세
밀히 조사하지 않았다. 반면, 기존의 함축(implicature) 접근 방식에 반
대하여 Bach (1999)는 고정함축 개념 자체가 허상이며 문맥에 따라 의
미가 달라질 수 있음을 역설한다. 하지만 두 가지 접근법 모두 이런 의
미들이 발생하는 독특한 맥락적 특성을 분석하지 않는다. 또, 화용론적 
전제(pragmatic presupposition) 이론이나 비핵심적 내용(not-at-
issue content) 이론과 같이 더 널리 받아들여지며 포괄적인 이론틀에서 
그들의 상위개념을 검증하고자 하지 않는다는 한계가 있다. 
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본 연구는 기존의 함축, 화용론적 전제, 그리고 비핵심적 내용 세 
이론의 관점에서 이 의미 현상을 설명한다. 첫째, 기존의 함축 접근법으
로 이 의미들이 어휘 관습(convention)에 뿌리를 두고 있지만, 특정 의
미는 대화의 맥락에서 파생되는 것을 보여준다. 둘째, 화용론적 전제의 
공통 토대 이론(common ground theory)의 틀 안에서 분석해볼 때, 이 
의미들은 공통 토대에 속해야 한다는 요건을 가지며 근접한 언어환경을 
넘어 세계에 대한 배경적 지식으로 확대되는 광범위한 맥락에서 발생하
는 것으로 관찰된다. 이러한 속성은 위 의미들을 정보성 있는 전제
(informative presupposition)와 대용적 전제(anaphoric 
presupposition) 양쪽 모두에 포함되지 않게 하며, 공통 토대 이론 내 
전제 수용 이론(accommodation theory)에 대한 반례로 작용한다.  
마지막으로, 이 의미들을 비핵심적 내용 이론(Tonhauser et al. 
2013)의 관점에서 분석한다. Tonhauser et al. (2013)의 비핵심적 내용
의 분류 체계를 채택하여, even, still, but의 함축 의미가 강한 맥락적 
제약(contextual felicity constraint)을 갖지만 의무적인 지엽적 효과
(obligatory local effect)는 없는 D그룹의 투사적인(projective) 비핵심
적 의미임을 보인다. D그룹은 담화적인 추론들을 포함하지만 even, still, 
but의 함축의미와 같은 전통적인 항목들은 포함시키지 않고 있다. 본 연
구에서는 이러한 D그룹 내의 이질성을 의무적인 지엽 효과를 지니지 않
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은 의미들에 수의적으로 수반될 수 있는 새로운 속성인 '의무적인 전체
적 효과' (obligatory global effect)를 통해 설명하고자 한다. 
마지막 접근법은 이전 두 가지와는 달리 위 의미들의 현상을 이해
하는 더욱 효과적인 도구를 제공한다. 강한 맥락적 제약의 존재는 기존
의 함축 또는 화용론적 전제 이론에서 충분히 설명하지 못했던 의미들의 
문맥 의존성을 입증한다. 또한, 이 의미들을 제약하는 맥락이 지엽적 혹
은 전체적 맥락 모두 가능함을 보임으로써 앞서 설명한 맥락의 광범위함
을 뒷받침한다.  
궁극적으로 본 연구는 배경 의미의 연구에 있어 다음과 같은 의의
를 지닌다. 첫째, even, still, but의 함축 의미들이 고정함축 또는 화용론
적 전제들과 구별되며 비핵심적 내용의 D그룹과도 이질적인, 독특한 맥
락적 특성을 지니는 새로운 의미 부류를 형성함을 보인다. 다음으로, 이
런 현상을 충분히 설명하지 못하는 기존의 고정함축 이론과 화용론적 전
제 이론에 허점이 있을 수 있음을 시사한다. 마지막으로, D그룹에 다른 
하위항목들과 구별되는 새로운 항목을 추가하고 잠재적인 세분화 기준을 
제시함으로써 비핵심적 내용에 관한 통합된 이해에 기여한다. 
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